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ARGUMENT
St. Mark's seeks a bright line rule whereby they can never be held accountable for
the people they allow to perform surgery on patients. Under St. Mark's analysis, the
statutes completely shield and insulate them from the decision to entrust an unqualified or
incompetent surgeon to command their surgical facilities. St. Mark's may freely open
their surgical facilities to unqualified, unskilled or incompetent surgeons without
restriction. St. Mark's can invite known narcotic abusers, formerly sanctioned
physicians, untrained surgeons, or even physicians with inadequate or non-existent
insurance coverage to perform surgery. St. Mark's reaps all the financial benefits derived
by throwing the doors to their surgical facilities open to all comers, while suffering none
of the consequences when their chosen surgeon injures or kills a patient. However,
neither the plain language of the Peer and Care Review statutes nor the Open Courts
Clause permit such a stunning legal precedent to be created.
I. THE CARE AND PEER REVIEW STATUTES PRESERVE PATIENT
RIGHTS, PROHIBITING ONLY RETRIBUTIVE LAWSUITS BY A
FALLEN HEALTHCARE PROVIDER.
A. The Plain Language Supports Recognition and Preservation of
Patient Claims.
Privileges and immunities are to be construed narrowly. "We previously have
concluded that because a privilege has the undesirable effect of excluding relevant
evidence, the term 'privileged' should be strictly construed in accordance with its

1

object."1 "We must not give the [statutory immunity] a broader interpretation than is
necessary to effectuate its purpose."2 St. Mark's nonetheless cuts a broad swath with the
immunities and privileges at issue in Utah's Care and Peer Review statutes. "By their
plain language, Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-4(2) and 58-13-5(7) grant broad immunity to
health care providers." (Appellee's Brief at p. 12)(emphasis added). However, a careful
review of the statutory language and the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals
reveals St. Mark's position to be unsupportable.
Utah's Care Review statute, § 26-25-1, offers an immunity only for providing
information to a discreet set of entities and committees.3 The immunity attaches only for
providing information to a specific and limited number of entities.4 Importantly, a claim
that the hospital negligently allowed an incompetent surgeon to use their facilities does
not turn on whether individuals provided information, but only on whether the hospital
exercised reasonable care in selecting and credentialing a physician. The immunity for
simply providing the information does not represent an absolute immunity against every
conceivable claim or cause. Nothing in Utah's Care Review statute prohibits or even
mentions negligence claims which may be brought by patients against hospitals for
allowing an unqualified or incompetent surgeon access to the surgical theatre. The Utah
1

Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ^ 14, 173 P.3d 848 (citation omitted).

2

Allen v. Ortez, 808 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1990).

3

See, Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1(1) "provide the following information;" (4)
"provide information;" (5)(a) "providing information."

4

Id
2

Court of Appeals recognized the liability and discovery limitations of the Care Review
statute as peculiar and specific, applying only to those limited circumstances enumerated
in the statute itself.5
Similarly, this Court also refused to interpret the scope of the privilege broadly,
applying only to documents or material prepared specifically for submission under either
a care or peer review. Benson v. I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. restricted application of the statute
to "only material and information prepared specifically for submission to a peer review
committee."6 The court further found that, as regards the Care Review statute, the
documents were indeed discoverable.7 Subsequent to this decision, the legislature
amended the Care Review privilege to preclude discovery of documents prepared
specifically for the purposes of care or peer review.8
However, the legislature made no attempt to restrict or undermine the common
law claims for negligence which were at issue in that case. Had the legislature wished to
restrict common law claims as part of the Care Review statute, as they did with
discovery, they could easily have included such restrictions in the revised statutes. The
fact that the legislature let those claims stands undermines St. Mark's assertion of a broad
statutory privilege and immunity for providing information which somehow operates to
foreclose claims based on their negligent selection and retention of unqualified surgeons.
5

Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App 352,123, 121 P.3d 74.

6

Benson v. I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., 866 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 1993).

7

Id.

8

See, Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3
3

Finally, the Peer Review immunities at issue do not foreclose all claims and offer
only a narrow safe harbor for participants. In Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. a
cardiologist brought a claim against the hospital after his surgical privileges were
limited.9 The surgeon based his claim on a denial of due process. The hospital raised the
predecessor Peer Review statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-12-25, 58-12-43, as a defense
and filed a motion for summary judgment that the surgeon could not bring his claim
because of the immunity. The trial court held that, under the former statutes, immunity
did not apply to hospitals.10
On review, IHC argued that the Peer Review statute was a 'broad' immunity
against all claims. "IHC would have the court interpret this section to mean that any act
taken by the hospital even remotely related to peer review process... is protected by
statutory immunity."11 This Court refused such argument. "[T]he plain language of the
statutes indicates that their purpose is to protect health care providers who furnish
information regarding the quality of health car rendered... Dr. Rees's suit against IHC
does not arise out of the fact that doctors and hospital administration provided adverse
information regarding his competence."12 Even while affirming the trial court's
conclusion that immunity did not apply to 'hospitals,' this Court further noted that the
statutes were inapplicable because they did not involve a claim against participants in the
9

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).

10

Id. at 1078.

11

Id. at 1077.

12

Id. at 1078.
4

peer review process, but instead involved a claimed termination of privileges without due
process.13
Subsequent to Rees, the legislature modified the statutory language to expressly
include 'hospitals/ 14 but again did not take the opportunity to correct or clarify the
interpretation that the statutory immunities only apply to prevent suit against individuals
participating in or supplying information during peer review. In short, if the legislature
were dissatisfied with this Court's narrow interpretation of the immunity, it could easily
have broadened the language. This Court refused the position that immunity attaches to
"any act taken by the hospital even remotely related to peer review process."15 Because
the legislature did not act to alter this holding as a misconception, it remains the law
today that the immunity provisions only shield individuals from suit for participating in
peer review proceedings.16
Utah's Peer review statutes, §§ 58-13-4, 5, provide only a limited immunity for
participants engaged in peer review. The safe harbor offered under those statutes
encourages health care providers to freely evaluate their colleagues' professional skills,
ethics, and character without fear of a retributive lawsuit being filed by the individual

13

Id.

14

See, Utah Code Ann. 58-12-43(6) (West 1991)

15

i t e , 808P.2datl077.

16

Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-5(7) shields participants only against "liability arising
from participation in a review." (emphasis added).
5

under scrutiny.17 Here, St. Mark's attempts to leverage the narrow Peer and Care review
processes and expand their coverage to include all documentation and considerations,
regardless of when they are generated or the claims and parties at issue in a given case.
St. Mark's interpretation of broad immunity and privilege under the statute finds no basis
in the plain language and runs contrary to this Court and the Court of Appeals previous
readings of the statutes.
Credentialing a physician for surgical privileges and the scope of those privileges
is not the same thing as the peer and care review processes. States with peer review
statutes generally conclude that any documentation or evidence generated outside the
peer review process remains discoverable.18 In Benson v. IHC, the court also agreed that
documents outside the peer review process remain discoverable.19 Because credentialing
involves the decision to grant privileges and allow a physician to use surgical facilities
based on what the hospital knew or should have known, the failure to exercise due care in
making the decision may still give rise to liability. Accordingly, the statutes relied upon
by St. Mark's cannot operate to shield them from liability for their poor judgment in
retaining an unqualified or incompetent surgeon.
17

Benson, 866 P.2d at 539-40.

18

See, May v. Wood River Tp. Hosp., 629 N.E.2d 170 (111. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1994);
Menoski v. Shih, 612 N.E.2d 834 (111. Ct App. 2d Dist. 1993); Hill v. Sandhu, 129 F.R.D.
548 (D. Kan. 1990); Willing v. St Joseph Hosp., 531 N.E.2d 824 (111. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1988).
19

See, Benson, 866 P.2d at 540 (the statute's rationale tends to favor a finding of
privilege only for "documents prepared specifically to be submitted for review
purposes.")
6

II. ST. MARK'S CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION RUN
AFOUL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and must be construed in a manner that
avoids constitutional conflict.20 Only by construing the statutes in the broad manner
urged by St. Mark's do the statutes present a constitutional issue. There is no question
that hospitals must act with reasonable care; requiring hospitals to exercise care when
privileging individuals merely represents those individualized circumstances (facts/
standard of care) which give rise to liability under this well-recognized duty. Therefore,
the Peer and Care Review statutes must not be construed to abrogate the remedy of
individuals to bring a court action when the hospital does not exercise due care. As
interpreted by St. Mark's the statutes offend both the open courts and equal protection
clauses of the Utah constitution.
A. St. Mark's Construction Eliminates a Right to a Remedy, Offers No
Meaningful Alternative and Fails to Advance the Admitted Bases for
the Statutory Immunities & Privileges.
At the outset, the Court should note that St. Mark's ignores the legal principle that
the legislature must speak in a manner which demonstrates an intent to occupy an entire
field of law before the statute may be read to eliminate individual claims.21 St. Mark's
offered no direct argument or authority in opposition to this point. St. Mark's argues their

20

Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, If 7, 57 P.3d 1007; Utah State Road Comm n
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 831 (Utah 1984)(Courts are "constrained to construe statutory
terms to avoid an unconstitutional application of the statute.").
21

(See, Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 17).
7

broad interpretation of the statutory immunity and privileges does not offend the open
courts clause because: (1) the 'cause of action' for negligent credentialing did not exist at
the time the statutes were enacted, the open courts claus was not violated; (2) the statutes
insulating hospitals from liability and lawsuit leave patients with reasonable alternative
remedies; and, (3) even if eliminating patient's rights, the statutes represent a reasonable,
non-arbitrary means of eliminating a social or economic evil. Appellant will address each
argument in turn.
L St. Mark's Confuses "Cause of Action" With Right to a Remedy.
St. Mark's begins from the faulty premise that "The Open Courts Clause was not
violated because negligent credentialing was not an existing cause of action." (Appellee
Brief at p. 19). St Mark's variously characterizes the Open Courts Clause as requiring an
"existing right of action" (Id at 19)(emphasis in original); an "existing remedy or cause
of action" (Id.): or, a "previously recognized cause of action." (LcL at 21).22 St. Mark's
misunderstanding springs from their reading of Wood v. University of Utah Med. CtrP
wherein the opinion regarding an open courts analysis was sharply divided.

22

Appellee St. Mark's repeatedly cites to a few district court decisions and claims
that "all the district courts" have held a claim for negligent credentialing does not exist.
(Appellee's Brief at 21). Unless St. Mark's has surveyed each and every court presented
with the issue, the claim that all district courts agree is at best a stretch. Further, the
district court decisions in this case have no relevance and cannot be viewed as persuasive
or precedent where the standard of review grants "no deference to the decision of the trial
court." Whipple v. American Forklrr. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996).
23

Wood v. University of Utah Med. Or., 2002 UT 134, 67 P.3d 436.
8

St. Mark's relies on the lead opinion in Wood to argue that the 'cause of action5
must be established.24 However, that opinion was not held by the majority of the court in
Wood. Specifically, only two justices joined in the lead opinion on open courts analysis.
Three justices joined in the separate dissenting opinion's analysis of the open courts
provision. The three justice majority held that "article I, section 11 is not concerned with
particular, identifiable causes of action, but rather with the availability of legal remedies
to vindicate individuals' interests in the integrity of their persons, property and
reputations."25
Moreover, in decisions and opinions subsequent to Wood, the principle that article
I, section 11 addresses legal remedies, not causes of action, was repeatedly reinforced.
For example, unanimous decision Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., held that "[t]he
legislature remains free to abrogate or limit claims that could not have been brought
under then-existing law" and "the mere fact that legislation abrogates an existing legal
remedy does not render it impermissible under the open courts clause."26 Similarly, in
State v. Merrill the court reaffirmed the "open courts provision ensures that citizens of
Utah have a right to a remedy for an injury."27 Finally, in Judd v. Drezga, the court stated
that "citizens of Utah have a right to a remedy for an injury."28
24

See, Appellee Brief at p. 21 citing Wood at ^ 14-15.

25

Wood, 2002 UT 134, Tf 56 (citation and quotation omitted).

26

Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30,ffi[17-18 (emphasis added).

27

State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, If 23, 114 P.3d 585

28

Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91,1f 10, 103 P.3d 135.
9

By highlighting iegal remedy/ the post-Wood opinions reaffirmed the majority
view in Wood that the Open Courts Clause preserves remedies, not 'causes of action.'
Further, pointing to 'claims that could not have been brought' as areas wherein the
legislature may freely work, the opinions implicitly recognize any 'cause of action' that
could have been brought remains protected under article I, section 11. This view makes
sense since litigants could have been pursuing claims and/or causes of action for years
with no official appellate recognition. Under appellate law dating back to 1907, the fact
pattern of negligently allowing incompetent surgeons into the surgical theatre presents a
claim that 'could have been brought' under the broad theory of corporate negligence.29
Simply because there exists no appellate decision formally naming, categorizing and
placing a claim in the legal taxonomy does not mean the claim is non-existent under
general law.
Additionally, it makes pragmatic sense to draw the line at 'legal remedy' because,
if it were required that specific causes of action must be previously recognized, the
legislature could simply craft fact specific legislation which gives a name to the cause of
action and effectively narrow or eliminate entire fields of law. Such a check on
legislative power would be no check at all and would fundamentally undermine the
foundations of Utah's social contract with its citizens.

29

See, Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass 'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 691, 696
(Utah 1907)(overruled on other grounds); and, Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial
Hospital Ass^n, 78 P.2d 645, 652 (Utah 1938); see, also, 'Sessions I'Sessions v. Thomas
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass Jnt 89 Utah 222, 51 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1935).
10

St. Mark's reliance on a minority holding undermines their broad interpretation of
the Peer and Care Review statutes. St. Mark's perverts the open courts analysis to require
that the specific factual circumstances be recognized as a 'cause of action.' However,
were it the case that specific factual bases for generalized negligence claims must be
expressly recognized and adopted as named torts, there would be no meaning to our open
courts clause as the legislature could freely abrogate causes of action by enumerating
those fact patterns not previously memorialized as a 'cause of action' by an appellate
court opinion.
2* No Alternative Remedy Exists for A Hospital's Failure to
Exercise Care In Choosing Those Who May Use Surgical Facilities.
St. Mark's lists a host of other claims and causes of action which a plaintiff may
bring. However, none of these claims or causes of action recognize the breach of duty
when a hospital allows incompetent and unqualified surgeons to command their surgical
facilities. Because St. Mark's offers no true 'alternative' remedy for this breach,
immunizing hospitals against liability eliminated the right to a remedy and offends article
I, section 11 's guarantee.
2L St. Mark's Interpretation Is Not a 'Reasonable' Means of
Eliminating a Clear Social or Economic Evil.
Notably, nowhere does the legislature speak of eliminating a clear social or
economic evil within the Peer or Care Review statutes, unlike the Architect and Builder's
Statute of Repose or the Medical Malpractice Cap.30 Because there is no legislative
30

See, Utah Code Ann. §§78B-2-225, and, 78B-3-410 (West 2008), respectively.
11

expression to cure a clear social and economic evil by immunizing a hospital from
liability for failing to exercise reasonable care in credentialing physicians, and because
St. Mark's points to no apparent social or economic evil, the statutes cannot be construed
as St. Mark's urges without violating the Open Courts provisions.
Assuming that the statutes are intended to cure a clear social evil by opening
communication to further improve healthcare, such goals are not obtained by granting an
absolute immunity against all claims The immunity afforded under the Peer and Care
Review statutes is a limited immunity for a specific purpose, not an absolute immunity
from suit. In Allen v. Ortez, the court held that limited immunities should be construed
narrowly, with only enough breadth to accomplish their purpose. The plaintiffs in Allen
brought claims against a social worker who made extra-judicial allegations of child abuse
in letters to the mayor, an attorney and a domestic relations commissioner. The defendant
relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 62A5-510 (1989) which stated: Any person, official, or
institution participating in good faith in making a report [of child abuse] ... is immune
from any liability, civil or criminal." The statute offered immunity only for specified
information provided to a discreet set of individuals.
The court refused to recognize this as an absolute immunity, shielding against all
claims. "We must not give the statute a broader interpretation than is necessary to
effectuate its purposes."31 The court explained "[t]he narrow purpose of this scheme is to
facilitate detection, investigation, prosecution, and prevention of child abuse by the
31

Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1990).
12

governmental agencies charged with those responsibilities. Its purpose is certainly not to
require, much less immunize, the general dissemination of allegations of child abuse."32
The recognized and admitted purpose of the Peer and Care Review statutes in this
case is to improve medical care and encourage the free flow of information during Care
and Peer Review.
The purpose of these statutes is to improve medical care by allowing health-care
personnel to reduce "morbidity or mortality" and to provide information to
evaluate and improve "hospital and health care." Without the privilege, personnel
might be reluctant to give such information, and the accuracy of the information
and the effectiveness of the studies would diminish greatly.33
St. Mark's themselves repeatedly point out "the legislative purpose of encouraging open,
frank and candid peer review without the fear of retribution and lawsuits." (Appellee's
Briefat6,7,23,24,25).
However, extending a Peer or Care Review to shield hospitals from their lack of
care in credentialing incompetent surgeons advances none of the goals associated with
granting a limited immunity or the purposes of the statutes. Shielding bad decisions does
nothing to improve healthcare' or to 'decrease morbidity or mortality.' Immunizing
hospitals from third-party liability simply because they participate in a Peer or Care
Review proceeding, does not guarantee a free and frank exchange of information.
Because providing an absolute immunity to hospitals advances none of the accepted goals

32

Id.

33

Benson, 866 P.2d at 539-540.
13

for these statutes, construing them with such a broad immunity offends the open courts
provision.
Further, St. Mark's offers no argument to demonstrate how eliminating the ability
of a third-party victim to bring a claim for the decision to credential furthers the admitted
legislative purpose. St. Mark's does not show how a third-party lawsuit would chill
participation by individuals on Peer and Care Review committees. St. Mark's inability in
this regard is simply because patients, injured by an incompetent surgeon given privileges
by a careless hospital, do not bring claims against Peer or Care Review committees.
Rather, the patient brings the claim against the hospital who exercised no due care in
choosing those to whom they open their operating rooms.
Finally, Appellant's claim sounds generally in negligence. The 'name' negligent
credentialing simply reflects those peculiar facts and circumstances giving rise to the
breach of duty. Under Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass 'n, and Sessions v.
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Utah law recognized the much broader
concept of corporate negligence for hospitals. Clearly, a claim for the failure to exercise
reasonable care in selecting physicians who may be privileged could have been brought
as early as 1907 in Utah. Utah's Peer and Care Review statutes should not be construed
to eliminate an individual's right to a remedy. Moreover, because no reasonable
alternative remedy exists and because eliminating the claim does not further the purpose

14

of the statutes at issue, St. Mark's interpretation and application violates the Open Courts
provision of the Utah Constitution.34
CONCLUSION
The plain language of the Peer and Care Review statutes provides no basis for the
absolute immunity sought by St. Mark's. Under St. Mark's analysis, they cannot be held
liable under any circumstances for the surgeons they allow to control and direct their
surgical facilities and staff. A surgeon could be a known drunkard, an unlicensed
physician or an untrained physician and St. Mark's would still be shielded from immunity
for allowing that physician into their surgery room.
St. Mark's alone acts and decides to open the doors. St. Mark's and St. Mark's
alone must be held responsible for the decision as to whom they let enter. Construing the
statutes to provide an absolute immunity removes any incentive for St. Mark's to act with
the care, discretion and consideration required when faced with such a monumental
decision. Foreclosing the possibility of those injured by St. Mark's poor decisions to seek
compensation eliminates a remedy by due course of law. Accordingly, Appellant
respectfully requests that this Court overturn the dismissal and give Appellant her day in
Court.

34

St. Mark's approach to the Equal Protection Clause mirrors their approach to Open
Courts. St. Mark's similarly offers no argument or authority to show that eliminating the
claim for negligence in selecting surgeons who may command their surgical facilities will
further a 'full and frank' discussion when it comes time to conduct either a Peer or Care
Review. Accordingly, St. Mark's suggestion that their interpretation also passes scrutiny
under an Equal Protection analysis fails.
15

Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of January, 2009.

Peter W. Summerill
Attorney for Appellant
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